including the experiments reported in Cox et al. (2007) and other designs for experiments outlined below.
The second section in the chapter discusses "utility functionals" that represent risk preferences for the five representative theories of decision making under risk listed above and defines a general class of theories that contains all of them. In section 3, we discuss issues that arise if the domain on which theories of decision making under risk aversion are defined is unbounded, as in the seminal papers on the expected utility theory of risk aversion by Arrow (1971) and Pratt (1964) and the textbook by Laffont (1989) . These prominent developments of the theory assume bounded utility (see, for example, Arrow 1971, p. 92 and Laffont 1989, p. 8) in order to avoid generalized St. Petersburg paradoxes on an unbounded domain. We demonstrate that this traditional assumption of bounded utility substitutes one type of problem for another because, on unbounded domains, bounded utility implies implausible risk aversion (as defined in section 3.1 below).
Our discussion is not confined to expected utility theory. We demonstrate that, on an unbounded domain, all five of the prominent theories of risky decisions have arguably implausible implications: with unbounded utility (or "value" of "money transformation") functions there are generalized St. Petersburg paradoxes and with bounded utility functions there are implausible aversions to risk taking.
One possible reaction to the analysis in section 3 might be: "So what? All empirical applications of risky decision theory are on bounded domains, so why should an applied economist care about any of this?" The answer to this question is provided in subsequent sections of the chapter in which we elucidate how the analysis on an unbounded domain causes one to ask new questions about applications of risky decision theories on bounded domains. We explain how finite St. Petersburg games provide robustness tests for empirical work on risk aversion on bounded domains. We discuss parametric forms of money transformation (or utility) functions commonly used in econometric analysis of lottery choice data and calibrate implications of parameter estimates in the literature for binary lottery preferences. These implied preferences over binary lotteries provide the basis for robustness tests of whether the reported parameter estimates can, indeed, rationalize the risk preferences of the subjects.
Finally, we consider risk aversion patterns that are not based on parametric forms of money transformation functions or probability transformation functions. We summarize recent within-subjects experiments on the empirical validity of the postulated patterns of risk aversion underlying the concavity calibration literature and extensions of this literature to include convexity calibration of probability transformations. We also explain why some across-subjects experiments on concavity calibration reported in the literature do not, in fact, have any implications for empirical validity of calibrated patterns of small stakes risk aversion. We discuss expected value theory (Bernoulli 1738) , expected utility theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947) , dual theory of expected utility (Yaari 1987) , rank dependent utility theory (Quiggin 1982 (Quiggin , 1993 , and cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992) . All five of these theories represent risk preferences with utility functionals that have a common form that is additive across states of the world (represented by the index 1, 2, j n = ⋅⋅⋅ ).
REPRESENTATIVE THEORIES OF DECISION UNDER RISK
This additive form defines a class D of decision theories that contains the above five prominent theories. We will review utility functionals for these five theories before stating the general functional form that can represent each theory's typical functional as a special case.
Expected value theory represents preferences over the lotteries with a functional of the form 1 We will avoid some otherwise tedious repetition by using similar affine transformations of utility (or "money transformation") functions, without explicit discussion, for other theories considered in subsequent paragraphs.
Expected utility theory represents preferences over the lotteries with a functional that can be written as where is the agent's initial wealth. Utility functionals (1) and (2) are both linear in probabilities, which in the case of expected utility theory is an implication of the independence axiom. Functional (2) is linear in money payoffs w y only if the agent is risk neutral. Expected utility theory contains (at least) three models. The expected utility of terminal wealth model (Pratt 1964 , Arrow 1971 assumes that risk preferences are defined over terminal wealth, i.e. that the "money transformation function" (or utility function) u takes the form ( , ) ( )
The expected utility of income model commonly used in bidding theory assumes that risk preferences are independent of wealth, i.e. that the money transformation function takes the form 1 The EV theory of risk preferences has the same implications if terminal wealth rather than income is assumed to be the random lottery payoff in the functional in statement (1).
( , ) ( ).
EUI u y w y
The expected utility of initial wealth and income model (Cox and Sadiraj 2006) represents risk preferences with a money transformation function of the ordered pair of arguments . This model includes as special cases the terminal wealth model in which there is full asset integration, the income model in which there is no asset integration, and other models in which there is partial asset integration.
3
The dual theory of expected utility represents preferences over the lotteries with a functional of the form
is linear in payoffs as a consequence of the dual independence axiom. The transformation function f for decumulative probabilities is strictly convex if the agent is risk averse. If the agent is risk neutral then the decumulative probability transformation function f is linear and hence the utility functional (3) is linear in probabilities (in that special case).
Rank dependent utility theory represents preferences over the lotteries with a functional of the form 4 (4)
Prospect theory transforms both probabilities and payoffs differently for losses than for gains. In the original version of cumulative prospect theory, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) defined gains and losses in a straightforward way relative to zero income. Some more recent versions of the theory have reintroduced the context-dependent gain/loss reference points used in 2 The expected utility of income model was used to develop much of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium bidding theory. See, for examples: Holt (1980) , Harris and Raviv (1981) , Riley and Samuelson (1981) , Cox et al. (1982) , Milgrom and Weber (1982) , Matthews (1983) , Maskin and Riley (1984) , and Moore (1984) .
3 See Harrison, et al. (2007b) and Heinemann (2008) for empirical applications of partial asset integration models. 4 We write the functional for rank dependent utility theory with transformation of cumulative probabilities in the same way as Quiggin (1982 Quiggin ( , 1993 . Some later expositions of this theory use a logically equivalent representation with transformation of decumulative probabilities.
the original version of "non-cumulative" prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) . Let r be the possibly non-zero reference point value of money payoffs that determines which payoffs are "losses" ( y r < ) and which payoffs are "gains" ( y r > ). And let the lottery money payoffs 
In utility functional (5): v is the value function for losses;
+ is the value function for gains; and and are the corresponding weighting functions for probabilities (or "capacities").
There is a discontinuity in the slope of the value function at payoff equal to the reference payoff , which is "loss aversion." 
Loss aversion, when defined as a discontinuity in the slope of the utility function at zero income, is consistent with the expected utility of income model (Cox and Sadiraj 2006) .
The additive-across-states form of (6) defines the class D of theories we discuss. This class contains all of the popular examples of theories discussed above. Many results in following sections apply to all theories in class D. Discussion in subsequent sections will describe some instances in which specific differences between the utility functionals for distinct theories are relevant to the analysis of properties of the theories we examine.
Before proceeding to analyze the implications of functionals of form (6), it might be helpful to further discuss interpretations of (6) We now proceed to derive some implications of theories in class D that have preferences over lotteries that can be represented by utility functionals with the form given by statement (6).
THEORY FOR UNBOUNDED DOMAIN:

ST. PETERSBURG PARADOX OR IMPLAUSIBLE RISK AVERSION
We here discuss theories of decision making under risk in the domain of discourse adopted in classic expositions of expected utility theory such as Arrow (1971) and Pratt (1964) , as well as in advanced textbook treatments such as Laffont (1989) . In contrast to those studies, our discussion is not confined to expected utility theory but, instead, applies to all decision theories in class D. (Arrow 1971, p. 92; Samuelson 1977) . We here explain that unbounded money transformation functions produce similar plausibility problems for other decision theories in class D (see also Rieger and Wang 2006 
Bernoulli (1738) famously reported that most people stated they would be unwilling to pay more than a small finite amount to play this game. A log utility of money function, offered by
Bernoulli as an alternative to the linear utility of money function, does solve the paradox of the original St. Petersburg lottery because is finite. This is shown for the expected utility of income model by . h
To illustrate Proposition 1, we report examples of generalized St. Petersburg games for some of the alternatives to expected utility theory in class D, including dual theory of expected utility, rank dependent utility theory, and cumulative prospect theory.
First consider the dual theory of expected utility with positively monotonic and convex transformation f for decumulative probabilities. According to this theory, the St. Petersburg game that pays n x if the first head appears on flip is evaluated by n 
if a fair coin comes up heads for the first time on flip is n (10) ( ) 
Note that is unbounded from above since the first term on the right hand side is always finite whereas the second term on the right is unbounded from above by construction of ( CP CP U X CP X . All of the above, of course, is also true if the reference point r is set equal to zero; therefore a prospect theory agent would prefer the lottery CP X to any finite amount of money.
In this way, for any unbounded money transformation function one can construct a generalized St. Petersburg paradox for any of the five decision theories when they are defined on an unbounded domain. Bounded money transformation functions are immune to critique with generalized St. Petersburg lotteries. We will explain, however, that on unbounded domains bounded money transformation functions imply implausible risk aversion, as next defined.
Let 2 { , ; } 1 y p y denote a binary lottery that pays the larger amount 2 y with probability p and the smaller amount 1 y with probability 1 p − . We define "implausible risk aversion" for binary lotteries as follows.
(I*) Implausible risk aversion: for any there exists a finite such that the certain amount of money is preferred to the lottery { ,
Bounded Money Transformation Functions
In order to escape the behaviorally implausible implications of the generalized St. Petersburg paradox for any theory in class D defined on an unbounded domain, one needs to use a money transformation function that is bounded from above. But bounded money transformation functions imply implausible risk aversion, as we shall explain. We start with two illustrative examples using bounded, parametric money transformation functions commonly used in the literature. Subsequently, we present a general proposition for bounded money transformation functions that applies to all theories in class D.
One of the commonly used money transformation (or utility) functions in the literature is the (concave transformation of the) exponential function, commonly known as CARA, defined as: Another common parametric specification in recent literature is the expo-power function introduced by Saha (1993) . Using the same notation as Holt and Laury (2002) , the expo-power function is defined as
The expo-power functional form converges to a CARA (bounded) function in the limit as and it converges to a power (unbounded) function in the limit as The implied risk aversion for the above examples of money transformation functions would be at least as implausible with use of these parametric forms in cumulative prospect theory and rank dependent utility theory as in expected utility theory because in these former two theories the probability of the high outcome is pessimistically transformed; i.e. .
(0.5) 0.5
So, if models of cumulative prospect theory and rank dependent utility theory utilize the same bounded money transformation function as an expected utility model, then if the expected utility model predicts preference of a sure amount x L + to risky lottery { , for all G , so do cumulative prospect theory and rank dependent utility theory.
0.5; }, G x
These examples with commonly used parametric utility functions illustrate a general property of all theories in class D that admit bounded money transformation functions. 10 The following proposition generalizes the discussion. 10 Clearly, Proposition 2 does not apply to expected value theory and the dual theory of expected utility theory because their money transformation functions are (linear and hence) unbounded. 
THEORY AND EXPERIMENTS FOR BOUNDED DOMAINS
As cited in Holt and Laury (2002, fn. 9, p.1649) , CRRA estimates in the range 0.44 to 0.67 were reported by Campo et al. (2000) , Chen and Plott (1998) , Cox and Oaxaca (1996) , Goeree and Holt (2004) , and Goeree, et al. (2002 Goeree, et al. ( , 2003 . Harrison, et al. (2007a) reports CRRA estimates within the same range using field experiment data. (2 ) (1 (2 )) ) ( (2 ) (1 (2 ) Table 1 shows a sequence of payments in an affordable St. Petersburg lottery for cumulative prospect theory models with α and γ parameter values reported by Camerer and Ho (1994) , Tversky and Kahneman (1992) , and Wu and Gonzales (1996) Finally, for the dual theory of expected utility we report payments involved in a generalized St. Petersburg game for two specifications of the function f:
The first specification is offered by Yaari as an example that solves the common ratio effect paradox (Yaari 1987, p.105) . The second specification is used to demonstrate a rationale for using the Gini coefficient to rank income distributions (Yaari 1987, p.106 by Cox et al. (2007) , involved offering subjects the opportunity to decide whether to pay their own money to play nine truncated St. Petersburg bets. One of each subject's decisions was randomly selected for real money payoff. Bets were offered for N = 1,2,…,9. Bet N had a maximum of N coin tosses and paid euros if the first head occurred on toss number , for and paid nothing if no head occurred. The price offered to a subject for playing bet N was 25 euro cents lower than N euros where, of course, N euros was the expected value of bet N. An expected value maximizer would accept all of these bets. The experimenter could credibly offer the game to the subjects because the highest possible payoff was 512 ( ) euros for each subject. Cox et al. (2007) report that 47 percent of their subjects' choices were to reject the opportunity to play the St. Petersburg bets. They use a linear mixture model (Harless and Camerer 1994 ) to estimate whether a risk neutral preference model can characterize the data. Let the letter denote a subject's response that she accepts the offer to play a specific St. Petersburg The expected value of this game is $23.5 whereas
Hence, the expected utility of income model predicts that the agent will prefer getting $10 for sure to playing this game. The expected value model, however, predicts that the agent prefers this game to getting $23 for sure.
For cumulative prospect theory, the last column of Table 1 2 ) 5.1 = as reported by Wu and Gonzales (1996) . A finite version of the generalized version of the St. Petersburg game for this case that can be credibly tested in the laboratory is v [503, 220, 96, 36, 4] . That is, the game pays $4 if a coin lands "head" on the first flip, $36 if the coin lands "head" for the first time on the second flip, $96 if the coin lands "head" for the first time on the third flip, $220 if the coin lands "head" for the first time on the fourth flip, and $503 otherwise. The expected value of this game is $68.19 whereas . Hence, cumulative prospect theory with the above parameter specifications predicts that the agent will prefer getting $26 for sure to playing this game. The expected value model, however, predicts that the agent prefers the game to getting $68 for sure. Implications such as these provide plausibility checks on reported parameter estimates.
0.5 G x ; } Table 2 presents some implications of two money transformation (or utility) functions using parameter estimates for three experiments with small stakes lotteries reported in the literature. The parameter estimates are taken from Harrison and Rutström (2008, Table 8, p. 120) .
Unlike the discussion in section 3.2 above, we here examine the implications of estimated parametric money transformation functions only on the local domains of the data samples used in estimation of the parameters. As shown at the top of Table 2 , data are from experiments reported by Holt and Laury (2005) , Hey and Orme (1994) , and Harrison and Rutström (2008) . As shown just below the top of the table, parameter estimates from two functional forms are used: CRRA and expo-power (EP). As shown at the next level in the table, estimates based on two theories are used: expected utility of income models (EU) and rank dependent utility models (RD).
The entries in the first and third columns of Table 2 convey the following information.
The third column reports parameter estimates for a rank dependent utility model with power functions for both the money transformation and probability transformation functions. Data from the experiment reported in Holt and Laury (2005) and, in that sense, that the estimated parametric utility function is implausible. Importantly, the prediction that $0.40 for sure is preferred to {$77, 0.5; $0} is clearly testable and, therefore, a conclusion about plausibility or implausibility of the estimated model can be based on data not mere opinion.
Estimation of the CRRA parameter using the expected utility of income model and data from Holt and Laury (2005) yields With this parameter, as reported in the second column of Table 2 , $4.30 for sure is preferred to the lottery {$77,
. The fourth and fifth columns of Table 2 Table 2 uses point estimates of parameters from three data sets and four combinations of money transformation and probability transformation functions to derive implied preferences for sure amounts of money (in all columns except the first) over binary lotteries (in the first column).
All of these implied preferences are stated on domains that are the same or smaller than those for the data samples. Furthermore, all of these implied preferences are testable with real, affordable experiments. Conducting such tests would provide data to inform researchers' decisions about whether the estimated parametric forms provide plausible or implausible characterizations of the risk attitudes of the subjects in experiments. Finally, similar experiments can be designed with binary lotteries based on any parameter estimates within the 90% confidence limits of the estimation if a researcher wants to thoroughly explore the plausibility question.
In preceding sections, we have explored testable implications for empirical plausibility of parametric forms of decision theories in class D. Some recent studies have identified patterns of risk aversion, known as calibration patterns, that can be used to test plausibility of theories under risk without any parametric specifications. Concavity calibrations involve certain types of patterns of choices that target decision theories under risk that assume concave money transformation (or utility) functions (Rabin 2000 , Neilson 2004 , Cox and Sadiraj 2006 , Rubinstein 2006 . Convexity calibrations, on the other hand, involve patterns of risk aversion that apply to theories that represent risk aversion with probability transformation functions (Cox, et al. 2007 ). The following three sections summarize what is currently known about the empirical validity of patterns of risk aversion underlying calibration propositions.
Do Concavity Calibrations of Payoff Transformation (or Utility) Functions Have Empirical
Relevance? Cox et al. (2007) report an experiment run in Calcutta, India to test the empirical validity of a postulated pattern of small stakes risk aversion that has implications for cumulative prospect theory, rank dependent utility theory, and all three expected utility models discussed in Cox and Sadiraj (2006) , the expected utility of terminal wealth model, the expected utility of income model, and the expected utility of initial wealth and income model. Subjects in the Calcutta experiment were asked to choose between a certain amount of money, x rupees (option B) and a binary lottery that paid x − 20 rupees or x + 30 rupees with equal probability (option A) for values of x from a finite set Ω . Subjects were informed that one of their decisions would be randomly selected for payoff. The amount at risk in the lotteries (50 rupees) was about a full day's pay for the subjects in the experiment. By Proposition 1 in Cox et al. (2007) , if a subject chooses option B for at least four sequential values of x then calibration of the revealed pattern of small stakes risk aversion implies behaviorally implausible large stakes risk aversion. They call any choice pattern that meets this criterion a "concavity calibration pattern" and test a null hypothesis that the data are not characterized by concavity calibration patterns against an alternative that includes them. To conduct the test, Cox et al.
(2007) applied a linear mixture model similar to that described in section 4.3. The reported point estimate for the proportion of the subjects in the Calcutta experiment that made choices for which expected utility theory, rank dependent utility theory, cumulative prospect theory (with 0 reference point payoff) imply implausible large stakes risk aversion was 0.495, with Wald 90 percent confidence interval of (0.289, 0.702). They conclude that 29 percent to 70 percent of the subjects made choices that, according to three theories of risky decision making, can be calibrated to imply implausible large stakes risk aversion. According to Proposition 2 in Cox et al. (2007) , this conclusion applies to all theories in class D that represent risk preferences with concave transformations of payoffs. Thus the conclusion applies to all expected utility models regardless of whether they specify full asset integration (the terminal wealth model), no asset integration (the income model), or partial asset integration (variants of the initial wealth and income model).
Prospect theory can be immunized to concavity calibration critique by introducing variable reference points set equal to the x values in the Calcutta experiments (Wakker 2005) .
The variable reference points do not, however, immunize prospect theory to other tests with data from the experiment because they imply that a subject will make the same choice (of the lottery or the certain payoff), for all values the sure payoff x . Cox et al. report that the likelihood ratio test rejects this "non-switching hypothesis" in favor of an alternative that allows for one switch at 5 percent significance level. Adding possible choice patterns with more than one switch to the alternative hypothesis would also lead to rejection of the non-switching hypothesis. Hence, variable reference points do not rescue cumulative prospect theory from inconsistency with the data from the experiment.
Do Convexity Calibrations of Probability Transformation Functions Have Empirical
Relevance? Cox et al. (2007) demonstrate that the problem of possibly implausible implications from theories of decision making under risk is more generic than implausible (implications of) decreasing marginal utility of money by extending the calibration literature in their Proposition 2 to include the implications of convex transformations of decumulative probabilities used to model risk aversion in the dual theory. They report another experiment run in Magdeburg, Germany in which subjects were asked to make nine choices between pairs of lotteries. Subjects were informed that one of their decisions would be randomly selected for payoff. Decision task i , for , presented a choice between lottery A that paid €40 with probability and €0 with probability 1 / and lottery B that paid €40 with probability ( 1 , €10 with probability , and €0 with probability 1 1, 2,...,9 i = /10 i /10 10 i −
. By Proposition 2 in Cox et al. (2007) , if a subject chooses lottery B for at least seven sequential values of the probability index then calibration of the revealed pattern of small stakes risk aversion implies implausible large stakes risk aversion for the dual theory. They call any choice pattern that meets this criterion a "convexity calibration pattern" and test the null hypothesis that the data are not characterized by convexity calibration patterns against an alternative that includes them. Again applying a linear mixture model, Cox et al. (2007) report that the linear mixture model yields a point estimate of 0.81 and Wald 90 percent confidence interval of (0.66, 0.95) for the proportion of subjects for which the dual theory implies implausible risk aversion. Thus the data are consistent with the conclusion that 66 percent to 95 percent of the subjects made choices that, according to the dual theory, can be calibrated to imply implausible large stakes risk aversion. Rabin (2000) initiated recent literature on the large stakes risk aversion implications implied by calibration of postulated patterns of small stakes risk aversion. His analysis is based on the supposition that an agent will reject a small stakes gamble with equal probabilities of 50% of winning or losing relatively small amounts, and that the agent will do this at all initial wealth levels in some large interval. For example, Rabin demonstrated that if an agent would reject a 50/50 bet in which she would lose $100 or gain $110 at all initial wealth levels up to $300,000 then the expected utility of terminal wealth model implies that, at an initial wealth level of $290,000, that agent would also reject a 50/50 bet in which she would lose $6,000 or gain $180 million.
Rabin (2000) and Rabin and Thaler (2001) stated strong conclusions about implausible risk aversion implications for expected utility theory implied by their supposed patterns of small stakes risk aversion but reported no experiments supporting the empirical validity of the suppositions. Their conclusions about expected utility theory were taken quite seriously by some scholars (Kahneman 2003, Camerer and Thaler 2003) and by a Nobel Prize committee (Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences 2002, p. 16), despite the complete absence of data consistent with the supposed patterns of small stakes risk aversion underlying the concavity calibrations. It is ironic that, in this heyday of behavioral economics, strong conclusions about the behavioral plausibility of theory could be drawn without any actual observations of behavior.
As explained by Cox and Sadiraj (2006) , observations of behavior consistent with the pattern of risk aversion supposed in Rabin's concavity calibration would have limited implications for risky decision theory because they would have no implications for expected utility models other than the terminal wealth model nor for other theories in class D in which income rather than terminal wealth is postulated as the argument of functional (6). Furthermore, an experiment that could provide empirical support for Rabin's supposition would have to be conducted with a within-subjects design, as we shall explain after first explaining problems with across-subjects experiments in the literature. Barberis et al. (2003) report an across-subjects, hypothetical experiment with a 50/50 lose $500 or gain $550 bet using as subjects MBA students, financial advisers, investment officers, and investor clients. They report that about half of the subjects stated they would be unwilling to accept the bet. They do not report wealth data for these subjects nor the relationship, if any, between subjects' decisions and their wealth levels; therefore the relation between the subjects' decisions and the supposed pattern of risk aversion used in concavity calibration propositions is unknown. Barberis et al. (2003) also report an across-subjects, real experiment with a 50/50 lose $100 or gain $110 bet using MBA students as subjects. They report that only 10 percent of the subjects were willing to play the bet. No wealth data are reported for these subjects either.
It is straightforward to show that any across-subjects experiment involving one choice per subject cannot provide data that would support the conclusion of implausible risk aversion.
Suppose one has a sample from an experiment (like the two Barberis et al. 2003 experiments) in which each of N subjects is asked to make one decision about accepting or rejecting a 50/50 lose $100 or gain $110 bet. Suppose that the initial wealth level of every subject is observed and that these wealth levels vary across a large range, say from a low of $100 to a high of $300,000.
Would such a data sample provide support for any conclusion about the expected utility of terminal wealth model? Without making other assumptions about preferences, the answer is clearly "no" as we next explain.
Suppose that we observe individual wealth levels [100, 300 ] 
SUMMARY IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORIES OF RISKY DECISIONS
Some implications for theories of decision making under risk are straightforward while others are nuanced.
Decision Theories on Unbounded Domain Have Implausible Implications
One implication is that all theories in class D have the same problems with respect to the plausibility of modeling decisions under risk on an unbounded domain. This conclusion follows from the demonstration that, on an unbounded domain, theories in class D are characterized by either the generalized St. Petersburg paradox or implausible aversion to risk of type (I*). This raises doubts about the plausibility of classic developments of expected utility theory for risky decisions (Pratt 1964 , Arrow 1971 . But this plausibility critique of the theory is not confined to expected utility theory; instead, it applies to all theories in a class that contains cumulative prospect theory, rank dependent utility theory, and dual theory of expected utility (as well as expected utility theory). In this sense, the fundamental problems shared by these theories may be more significant than their much-touted differences.
Implications for Theory and its Applications on Bounded Domains
Theories of risky decisions defined on bounded domains can be characterized by the generalized St. Petersburg paradox or by implausible large stakes risk aversion or by neither problem.
12 In contrast, this type of experiment could not produce data that would have a calibration-pattern implication for any of the other models discussed above for which income, not terminal wealth is the argument of the utility functional (Cox and Sadiraj 2006 Cox et al. (2007) , 30 percent to 67 percent of the subjects revealed risk preferences that were inconsistent with the expected value model.
There is not yet any existing study that supports the conclusion that terminal wealth models are more vulnerable to calibration critique than income models. There are various misstatements in the literature about the existence of data supporting Rabin's (2000) supposition that an agent will reject a given small stakes bet at all initial wealth levels in a wide interval. In fact, there is no test of Rabin's supposition in the literature. Furthermore, a test of this supposition would, in any case, have no implications for models in which income rather than terminal wealth is the argument of utility functionals (Cox and Sadiraj 2006) .
The within-subjects Calcutta experiment with concavity calibration reported by Cox et al. (2007) has implications for all three expected utility models, rank dependent utility theory, and the original version of cumulative prospect theory with constant reference point equal to zero income (Tversky and Kahneman 1992) . This was a within-subjects, real payoff experiment. In the Calcutta experiment, 25 percent to 62 percent of the subjects made patterns of small stakes risky choices for which expected utility theory, rank dependent utility theory, and prospect theory (with zero reference point payoff) imply implausible large stakes risk aversion. Variable reference points can be incorporated into prospect theory in ways that immunize the theory to concavity calibration critique with this experimental design. But the testable implication of this version of prospect theory has a high rate of inconsistency with data from the Calcutta experiment and is rejected in favor of the "calibration pattern" by a likelihood ratio test.
The Madgeburg experiment with convexity calibration for probability transformations (Cox et al. 2007 ) has implications for the dual theory of expected utility that has constant marginal utility of money and incorporates risk aversion solely through non-linear transformation of probabilities. In this experiment, 66 percent to 95 percent of the subjects made patterns of risky choices for which the dual theory of expected utility implies implausible large stakes risk aversion.
We conclude that, together, the Calcutta concavity calibration experiment and Magdeburg convexity calibration experiment provide data that suggest skepticism about the plausibility of popular theories of decision making for risky environments. However, more experiments and larger samples are needed to arrive at definitive conclusions about the empirical relevance of the calibration propositions. One thing that is clear is that the traditional focus on decreasing marginal utility of money as the source of implausible implications from calibration of postulated patterns of risk aversion is wrong; modeling risk aversion with probability transformations also can produce implausible implications from calibration.
Empirical research leading to conclusions that estimated parametric forms of utility functionals can represent subjects' behavior in risky decision making can be checked for plausibility by applying research methods explained here. Two types of questions can be posed.
First, does the estimated parametric form survive testing with St. Petersburg lotteries that can be derived from the parametric form using methods explained above? Second, does the estimated parametric form of a utility functional survive experimental testing with binary lottery designs that can be derived from the parametric form using methods explained above? If the answer to either question is "no" then the conclusion that the estimated utility functional can rationalize risk taking behavior is called into question. n n x = , [2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512] [2, 5, 9, 20, 42, 91, 196, 422] (CE(L)=10.56; EV(L) =12.19) (f(p)=p/(2-p))
L= [2, 6, 14, 30, 62, 126, 254, 510 [1, 4, 18, 85, 408] (CE(L)=9.78; EV =34.56) a A prize vector of length k means the lottery pays the n-th coordinate when head appears for the first time on flip n for n<k, and k x otherwise.
b The estimate of alpha is the estimate of Wu and Gonzalez (p.1686) using Camerer and Ho (1994) data. c (field data) Campo et al. (2000) . d Tversky and Kahneman (1992) . e Wu and Gonzalez (1996) .
f Camerer and Ho (1994) . 
